For Rational Re-enchantment of Antiseptic Nature

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Political ecology considers the dynamic change of the relationship between society and nature. According to Blaikie and Brookfield, political ecology combines the concerns of ecology with a broadly defined political economy (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 17). In political ecology, the cause of ecological degradation is put on the social relations of production (Watts & McCarthy, 1997: 72). It means that environmental issues can not be understood without considering the political and economical contexts from which it is derived (Bryant & Bailey, 1997: 28). Moreover, political ecology is interested in the impact of modernization to environment. Because, in many cases, the modernization has played an important role in environmental degradation, in particular, of the developing countries. In sum, political ecology try to explain the change of relationships between nature and society which is derived from the process of modern development, although it has so various research fields and arguments (Greenberg & Park, 1994:1-12).

However, in spite of many case studies in political ecology, theoretical investigation about the comprehensive relationship between nature and society has not seemed to be done sufficiently in political ecology. Among the many research fields of political ecology, this paper will focus on the tradition of political economy and critical theory (or Frankfurt School). Because they have affluent potentials for comprehensive study about relationship between nature and society. Main goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensively rational explanation and suggestion about the relationship between nature and society for political ecology.

1. Concept of Domination of Nature and its limit

Domination of nature is one of the main arguments of Frankfurt School. As is well known, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno told that the “Enlightenment” as the revelation of the reason was not a process of demythologisation of the world. On the contrary, it is another kind

1 In line with it, David Harvey wrote that “Every ecological project(and discussion) is at the same time politico-economic project, and vice versa”(Harvey, 1993: 25).
of myth (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972: xvi). They thought that the ‘object reason’ (the identity of subject and object) has been destroyed due to the ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’ and the ‘subject reason’ (the non-identity of subject and object) came to dominate the world. The subject reason was understood as an instrumental rationality. The ultimate and fundamental goal of the subject reason is the ‘self-preservation’ and it can only be accomplished at the expense of the external nature. The external nature is considered as a bundle of bodies in externally lawful motions and as an objects of scientific knowledge. The science is separated from philosophy and represents the instrumental rationality. It only dominates external nature and represses the internal nature (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972: xi).

The theme of ‘domination of nature’ and duality of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ nature are reiterated in the argument of Alfred Schmidt who firstly articulates the discussion about the relationship between nature and society in Frankfurt School(1971). When Schmidt investigated the concept of nature in Marx, he focused on the relationship between nature and society, regarding it as separate beings. As for him, the relationship of nature and society is expressed as a ‘differentiated unity of nature and society. Because nature is socially mediated.

“The whole of nature is socially mediated and, inversely, society is mediated through nature as a component of total reality. The hidden nature-speculation in Marx characterizes this side of the connection. The different economic formations of society which have succeeded each other historically have been so many modes of nature’s self-mediation”(Schmidt, 1971: 78-79).

As for Schmidt, the concept of nature in Marx was different from that of bourgeois, in particular, Kant who sharply separated nature and society as a distinct sphere based on his epistemology. But, Schmidt thought, in Marx, nature is socially mediated and society is mediated through nature. And, it is different from the concept of nature in Hegel’s ideal identity at the same time. Hegel thought the absolute spirit had self-relation with itself, i.e., large ‘Subject’ through the objective activity. But, in Marx, nature, instead of absolute spirit, has self-relation with itself through the objective activity (labour). As for Schmidt, the ‘dialectic of nature’ in Marx should be understood as the ‘social mediation of nature’.

“Nature becomes dialectical by producing men as transforming, consciously acting Subjects confronting nature itself as forces of nature….Nature is the
Subject-Object of labour. Its dialectic consists in this: that men change their own nature as they progressively deprive external nature of its strangeness and externality, as they mediate nature through themselves, and as they make nature itself work for their own purpose” (Schmidt, 1971: 61).

Since Schmidt focused on realm of use values, he regarded the labour process, in its essential material aspects, is ‘eternal nature-imposed necessity’ (Schmidt, 1971: 91-92; Smith, 1984: 21 recited). Considering nature in the realm of use-value, Schmidt thought that the mastery of nature by humans were inevitable. This is the same conclusion of his teachers, Horkheimer and Adorno; ‘Domination of nature is inevitable even in socialist society’. Against the utopianism of Marx who positively admits the technological achievement in socialist society, Schmidt asserts that technological development is not emancipation but domination even in socialist society (Schmidt, 1971: 136).

However, the term of ‘dialectic of nature’ in Schmidt means just metabolism between separate things; nature and society. It is not the ‘dialectic of nature and society’ as Marx had intended. Why is this sort of duality found in argument of Schmidt? According to Neil Smith (1984), this duality came from his ignorance of the historicity of labour process and retreat from economy to philosophy like other Frankfurt School. And he insists that Marx did not understand nature this way.

“He (Schmidt-author) begins by emphasizing that an examination of nature must focus on the realm of use-values, which he distinguishes sharply from exchange-values......This absolute distinction seems reasonable, even insightful, at first, but less so as its consequences reveal themselves. The labour process, for example, Schmidt depicts as historically unchanging, but it is so only in its most abstract, material (use-value) aspects. The moment we examine the relation between use value and exchange value, historically separated modes of production are readily identifiable – indeed, can only be identified by considering exchange value relations...Had Schmidt understood the importance of exchange-value in determining the historical relation with nature, his view of the labour process, which he correctly puts at the centre of his understanding of nature in Marx, would have been dramatically different (Smith, 1984: 26-27).

Then, if we reckon the importance of exchange-value in determining the historical relation with nature, how can we conceptualise the relationship between nature and society? As an
alternative to the theme of ‘domination of nature’, Neil Smith proposes the concept of ‘production of nature’ (Smith, 1984: 31).

2. Concept of Production of Nature and Its Limits

2.1. The Concept of Production of Nature

The concept of ‘production of nature’ explained by Neil Smith is meant that nature is produced by historically identifiable labour process. Here, the ‘historically identifiable labour process’ is very important. Smith insists that “social labour lays at the heart of our comprehension of the social relation with nature” (Smith, 1998: 277). As Smith referred to the concept of nature in Marx, “Marx treated nature as a differentiated unity, but at different periods the emphasis upon unity and differentiation varies” (Smith, 1984: 33). Nature is differentiated, however, at the same time, unified by historically and socially different labour process. Within the different labour process, we can produce different nature. To clarify the meaning of the differentiated unity of nature through the history, Smith uses the ‘dialectic of use-value and exchange-value of nature’ (Smith, 1984: 37). The dialectical relationships of use-value and exchange-value are changed at each historical phase of production of nature.

He distinguishes different historical phases. In phase of ‘production for exchange’, “exchange-value falls within the realm of nature as soon as a second nature, through the production of commodities, is produced out of the first (nature-author). The relation with nature is mediated by exchange-value as well as use-value determinations” (ibid). If we don’t understand the fact that nature contains the exchange-value, we might be trapped in the bourgeois’s dualism as seen in Schmidt again. The ‘interaction’ between separate beings is not the same as the dialectical relationship (Smith, 1984: 47).

In phase of capitalist production, relation with nature came to be qualitatively changed. Humans began to produce nature at a world scale. The difference of the first and second nature in capitalist production should be distinguished from that of ‘production for exchange’. First nature is material and concrete and ‘human labour’ produces it. Second nature is abstract and derivative of the abstraction from use-value and ‘human relations’ produce it (Smith, 1984: 55). The differentiated unity of nature in capitalist production is provided by social production process (Smith, 1984:57). Humans make their own history under the condition which is given and transmitted from the past. Therefore, humans can produce historically and socially different nature. Since we can produce nature differently, the main question should be “how we produce nature and who controls this production of nature” (Smith, 1984: 63). Even though there is unity
of nature in capitalism, it is temporary one. According to Smith, the possibility of real unity of nature will be accomplished in socialism.

“Socialism is neither a utopia nor a guarantee. It is however the place and the time where and when the unity of nature becomes a real possibility. It is the arena of struggle to develop real social control over the production of nature. Early in his life, Marx pictured communism as the ‘genuine resolution of the conflict between men and nature…..Later in his life, Marx was less speculative as regards the relation with nature, more circumspect about what communism may or may not be……The ultimate demand is for worker’s control, control over the production process and hence control over the production of nature; that is, the overthrow of capitalism and its control of society through control of the exchange-value system " (Smith, 1984: 63-64).

Unlike the argument of domination of nature, Neil Smith suggests the emancipation of nature through the worker’s control over the production of nature. In other words, in socialism, the real unity of nature and society will be overcome. Because social production process contains no contradiction in socialism.

However, if workers control over the production of nature, will there be no ecological problem? Unfortunately, in real world, we have witnessed the ecological disaster of socialist countries. How can we explain this fact? On top of it, what is the meaning of genuine resolution of the conflict between men and nature? What is the limit or problem of the concept of production of nature?

2.2. Limits of the Concept of Production of Nature

We can identify two limits or problems in the argument of production of nature. First, there is no enough explanation about reproduction of society. Second, there is a sort of political immobility in Marxist analysis of environmental studies. Let’s examine the first one. According to Michael Redclift,

“What happens to the environment in the process of transformation cannot be confined to commodity production, since the society’s very ability to reproduce itself and consume Nature is at stake. The reproduction of human society, together with the reproduction of Nature, are both processes which cannot easily be reduced to a division between use values and exchange
values…..The environment is more than the production of Nature. The capacity of a system to reproduce itself, biologically as well as socially, rests with the sustainability of its components, at base the family and the resources it commands” (Redclift, 1987: 228-229).

As Redclift says, the transformation of nature can not be confined to production of commodity. Of course, Smith adopted the concept of production which has been reinterpreted by Henri Lefebvre. The production is not confined to material level. Lefebvre insisted that “production as social practice suffuses all societies but its concrete form is radically differentiated from one to the other” (Smith, 1998: 278). Therefore, we can say that Smith assumes the polyvalence of the term of production. However, it is true that he does not suggest any explanation about the reproduction of society. Why didn’t he do it? This paper assumes that this is a limit derived from the paradigm of social labour of Marx upon which the argument of production of nature is relied.

The concept of social labour has a sort of limit in explaining comprehensive social relationship, i.e., the reproduction of society. This limit is criticized by Jürgen Habermas. To begin with, Habermas asks like this: “Does the concept of social labour sufficiently characterize the form of human reproduction of life?” His answer is very negative.

“Thus the Marxian concept of social labor is suitable for delimiting the mode of life of the hominids from that of the primates; but it does not capture the specifically human reproduction of life. … The concept of social labour is fundamental, because the evolutionary achievement of socially organized labor and distribution obviously precedes the emergence of developed linguistic communication, and this in turn precedes the development of social role systems. The specifically human mode of life, however, can be adequately described only if we combine the concept of social labor with that

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3 However, understanding the meaning of social labour in Marx is far from explicit task. In his comprehensive and thorough investigation about it, Young-Do Park suggests that the duality of social labour in Marx should be regarded as deconstructing the subject-philosophy of Kant and Hegel (Park, 1994, in particular, pp.109-161). According to him, the duality of social labour in Marx should be understood as having two connections. One is object-connections of social labour. Most of all, social labour is objectifying activities and it deconstruct the identity of being and consciousness. Because, as for Marx, the objectivity should not be reduced into the consciousness. On top of it, the social labour has social-connection. In ‘Theses On Feuerbach’, Marx said “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations” (Marx, in Elster, 1986: 22). It means that the identity of self-consciousness is constructed socially. The social relations are not constructed between subject and object. Rather, social relations construct the very basis for the interacting of subject and object. Such a transition from philosophy to science in Marx’s theory means the change of the structure of reflexivity. Since Descartes, the philosophical criticism has been based on reflection. But it has been concerned with only consciousness. With the concept of social labour in Marx, the reflection came to have connection with the social relations on which philosophical discussion can thrive (Park, 1994: 129).
of the familial principle of organization. The structures of role behavior mark a new stage of development in relation to the structures of social labor; rules of communicative action, that is, intersubjectively valid and ritually secured norms of action, cannot be reduced to rules of instrumental or strategic action. Production and socialization, social labor and care for the young, are equally important for the reproduction of the species; thus the familial social structure, which controls both-the integration of external as well as of internal nature-is fundamental." (Habermas, 1979: 135, 137-138).

Therefore, as an alternative for the concept of social labour, Habermas suggests the communicative action theory. We will return this point next section of this paper.

Second limit of the argument of production of nature is the political immobility in Marxist environmental studies. Ironically, this point is very well described by Neil Smith himself. He admits the limit of the leftish critique to the ideology of nature and political atrophy in the concept of production of nature. He diagnoses this problem as antiseptism of leftish politics.

“As a sometime participant in these critique of ideologies of nature, however, I am increasingly convinced that for all the merit of our deconstructive erudition, we are left with a rather antiseptic nature which has little if any political appeal. For all that our dismantling of idolatry is a vital, always ongoing part of any critical politics of social reconstruction, it has not prevented defeat……But it remains true that the strengths of left analytical antisepticism have not left much room for the reconstruction of a powerful anti-ideology of nature that takes seriously the realities of the production of nature interwoven with deep emotional significance…..Our analyses may be right as rain but they have little or no ability to move people about such a deeply resonant array of experiences as are implied in ‘the relation to nature’. I want to insist that the re-enchantment of nature not be left the right, or even to a sentimental liberalism, and that such deep feelings of connectedness to nature somehow be mobilized against establishment environmentalism.” (Smith, 1998: 279-280).

His emphasis on the ‘re-enchantment of nature’ and ‘connectedness to nature’ surprises us, although he says that it should not be left to the right or liberalism. Because, in his argument before it, he criticizes limits of cultural politics on nature which has been vivid characteristics of Frankfurt School; “The politicization of nature is conveyed less as the result of historical
achievements or political activities than of a rhetorical diagnosis of contemporary cultural forms and events” (Smith, 1996: 44). Then, how can he accomplish the task of politicisation of nature by re-enchanting nature without falling into the trap of irrationality? Smith hesitates to answer this question. He just said that this project will start at the “desolate junction of poetics and political economy” (Smith, 1998: 280). Smith looks like to have an affirmative evaluation to the ‘politics of romance’ in literary work of Anglo-American modernism. (Smith, 1998: 281).

However, if we follow the politics of romance, we immediately face with the problem of ‘critique without justification’ which is characteristics in romanticism. According to Hegel, romanticism has unity with nature through ‘intuition’. It seemed to him as another expression of narrow ‘understanding’ (as in case of Kant) rather a comprehensive ‘reason’ (Park, 1994: 65-66). Therefore, we feel irony when Smith says that “the ‘production of nature’ thesis is intended to shift the intellectual fulcrum from a Kantian to a Hegelian ‘constructionism’” (Smith, 1998: 277). Smith wants to rely on Hegelian constructionism and at the same time wants to expect some insight from the ‘politics of romance’ which Hegel had criticized.

In sum, the argument of production of nature has two limits. The first limit came from its adherence to the paradigm of social labour of Marx. Due to this paradigm of social labour, we can not find sufficient explanation about the mechanism of reproduction of society. The second limit came from its analytical antiseptism toward nature. Due to this antiseptism, we lost deep emotional connectedness to nature which is very important for progressive environmental politics. Then, how can we overcome this dilemma of the argument of production of nature? At first glance, the theory of communicative action theory of Jürgen Habermas seems to be an appropriate one. Because, he criticizes and provides an alternative for the paradigm of social labour of Marx. On top of it, as he still clings to the project of enlightenment rationality with the idea of communicative rationality which the Horkheimer and Adorno didn’t considered, there could be some possibility of rational way of re-enchantment.

3. Theory of Communicative Action and Its Limit

As an alternative for the paradigm of social labour, Habermas suggests paradigm of linguistics: the communicative action theory. Habermas vividly declares the distinction of category of labour and interaction. With this distinction, Habermas commits a paradigm shift from ‘the paradigm of consciousness’ to ‘the paradigm of linguistics’. As is well known, Habermas focuses on the empirical and procedural dimension of communicative action. Because, he wants to capture the comprehensive rationality and to overcome the universality of Kantian metaphysics simultaneously. Therefore, Habermas chooses very special form of
understanding in communicative action. In scheme of Habermasian communication, understanding is accomplished by hearer’s critical verification to the validity of proposition of speaker. The ‘validity claim’ in speech acts means that speaker’s proposition should be true, legitimate and truthful one. Therefore, speech acts is based on comprehensive rationality instead of the narrow instrumental rationality. And it is procedural, because the validity of proposition is verified by hearer (Habermas, 1984, 1987). Based on communicative rationality, communication act can be possible. And, this communication act presupposes comprehensive world including subjective, objective and social world. It means that Habermas can explain the whole range of social action of humans including reproduction of society without giving up rationality of enlightenment (Habermas, 1984).

If we follow the track of Habermas, we can get comprehensive explanation about the reproduction of society based on communicative action. Because he systematically recovers the meaning and mechanism of life world and describes the ‘colonization of life world’ as pathological phenomenon of the late capitalist society. In addition to this, we can have some clue about the rational way of re-enchantment of nature. Because he referred to what should be the rational communication with nature in his theoretical framework, in particular, at the level of ethics. We can find it in his discussion on ‘discourse ethics’ (Habermas, 1993).

As for the communication with natural world, Habermas admits that we can (or should say that we can) communicate with animals, even though not same way with humans. Unlike rocks or plants, animals can partake in social life and encounter us as ‘alter ego’. Therefore, we have asymmetrical duties about animals (Habermas, 1993: 110). Since we communicate and interact with animals in non-communicative way, we have quasi-moral responsibility. However, other species are different. The human responsibility toward other species except animal cannot be morally justified. Because we don’t communicate with them even by non-communicative way (Habermas, 1993; 111).

Then, can we say that the theory of communicative action of Habermas provides enough explanation about communicative relationship between nature and society? Is it sufficient for rational re-enchantment of nature? Answer is negative. Habermas’ understanding to the communicative relationship between nature and society is very restricted. In critique of concept of social labour in Marx, Habermas expels nature from the realm of society. Therefore, we can say that Habermas provides insufficient clue for the rational re-enchantment of nature. In other words, he does not admit the communicative relationship with nature except animal. Therefore, we need another explanation for it. Discussion of ‘social construction of nature’ suggested by Klaus Eder looks like an appropriate one for this.

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4 For the critique to the concept of understanding in Habermas, see Callinicos(1987). Callinicos suggests ‘principle of human nature’ of Donal Davidson as an alternative for it.

For rational re-enchantment of nature, this paper will examine the concept of ‘social construction of nature’ provided by Klaus Eder (1996). Correcting the ignorance of culture in historical materialism, Eder identifies three types of social construction of nature; cognitive, normative and symbolic construction of nature (Eder, 1996: 21-32). In cognitive construction of nature, cognitive differentiation of knowledge becomes an initial mechanism of cultural construction of a societal relationship to nature (Eder, 1996: 21). As the different activities of people develop, the cognitive knowledge about nature also develops differently. It means that if we have different form of cognition about the nature, our material appropriation of nature could have different form. Therefore, a sort of cognition which considers nature as just non-human is one of the various forms of cognition, i.e., one specific societal relationship with nature. Therefore, the modern way of appropriating nature (expressed in the phrase of ‘exploitation of nature’) is not the only way of material appropriation of nature. We can think culturally different way of material appropriation of nature.

Normative construction of nature shows that the relationship of nature and society can not be morally neutral. In addition to the cognitive construction of nature, “Nature also forces a normative definition of itself upon us. It means that nature acquires political content” (Eder, 1996: 25). For example, since after the European modernity has prevailed, the phrase of ‘struggle with nature’ became part of an ‘ethic of principles’. In accordance with this ethics, nature should be regarded as an enemy which we have to conquer. However, the result of our conquest of nature has been self-defeating. As the argument of ‘risk society’ or ‘reflexive modernization’ of Ulrich Beck has shown, we live with a ‘manufactured uncertainty’ or ‘risk’ which has been derived from the consequence of our conquest of nature (Beck, et al, 1994). And in capitalist society, “the normative elements of nature is dissolved into its use. That has become a cultural foundation of capitalist interaction with nature” (Eder, 1996: 27). Therefore, normative social construction of nature is the condition of critique toward modern relationship with nature (Eder, 1996: 28). Nature is a battlefield for social conflict.

Symbolic construction of nature means that “symbolic representation of nature and the associated communicative practices (ritual as well as discursive!) are the expression of a societal relationship to nature manifesting itself in consumption” (Eder, 1996: 29). As there are competing normative relationships with nature, there are competing discourse or idea on nature, i.e., ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ discourse on nature. In modern times, the orthodox discourse on
nature is utilitarian discourse. The heterodox discourse can be romantic, feminist, and aboriginal discourses. These heterodox discourses on nature can show that “nature can have meanings that transcend the morally based critique of the modern societal relationship to nature” (ibid). Symbolic construction of nature is “a part of politicisation of nature under different normative circumstances” (Eder, 1996:30). Whether heterodox contributes to the “re-enchantment of the world is dependent upon the social conflicts over the symbolic meaning of nature” (ibid). Then, with the discussion of social construction of nature, how can we re-enchant nature without being reactionary or mystically romantic?

5. Towards Rational Re-enchantment of the Antiseptic Nature

As we examined above, culture provides necessary media in social construction of nature and makes reflexive praxis possible. Culturally different form of material appropriation of nature, alternative norms for relationship between nature and society, and heterogeneous symbol for nature is required for rational re-enchantment of nature. Among the three folded dimensions for rational re-enchantment of nature, this paper will concentrate on only normative dimension. Because, normative dimension will be foundational condition for critique towards the modern social construction of nature. For this purpose, I will suggest a desirable goal and relevant strategy for rational re-enchantment of nature. The desirable goal is ecologically democratic relationship between nature and society. And a relevant strategy is the ‘ecologisation’.

5.1. Ecologically Democratic Relationship between Nature and Society

As we have seen above, the theory of communicative action does not give us sufficient explanation about what is the communicative relationship between society and nature. But it should not be denied. On the contrary, it should be extended further. Even nature can not communicate with us in linguistic form, they can communicate in different manner. As John Dryzek insists, nature is agency albeit not subjectivity. Because nature is not inert, silent, plastic, or passive. Rather, they play a constitutive and active roles in interaction with society, even though they lack the self-awareness that connotes subjectivity (Dryzek, 1995: 20). And they

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5 Martinez-Allier refers to it as the ‘politicized environment’. See Martinez-Allier(1995)
6 At first glance, Eder and Schmidt have many common things. They focus on ‘use-value’ of nature and they insist that nature are socially constructed or mediated. However, how Eder can escape from the trap of determinism and pessimism as shown in case of Frankfurt School? The secret is lied in his focusing on ‘culture’. Instead of retreating from science to philosophy like Schmidt. Eder goes to the sphere of culture. As culture is historical itself, he can use the term ‘history of use value of nature’.
7 Arguing ‘ethics of judgment’, Benhabib criticizes that the ‘discourse ethics’ of Habermas is inclined to
can communicate in different manner from humans. Negative feedback or signals emanating from the natural world is a non-verbal form of their communication. Therefore, communication with nature is not mythical but rational affair.

“For this recognition of agency in nature means that we should treat signals emanating from the natural world with the same respect we accord signals emanating from human subjects, and as requiring equally careful interpretation. In other words, our relation to the natural world should not be one of instrumental intervention and observation of results oriented to control. Thus communicative interaction with the natural world can and should be an eminently rational affair” (Dryzek, 1995: 20-21).

If we admit that nature can communicate with us in a different sense, we have to consider about the issue of ‘representing nature’. In the scheme of theory of communicative action in Habermas, the possibility of representing of nature is not discussed. Because, under the situation of ideal communication, all individual participants in communicative action should represent themselves. Of course, this kind of representation is not confined to narrow and partial one. Rather, it is related to the ‘other-regarding’ role playing of participants in communication community (Eckersley, 1999: 26). However, it is still remained in anthropocentric representation and there is no room for nature. Moreover, this kind of scheme is much westernised one. Because, “the conditions of the so-called free speech situation privilege certain western speech styles and forms of communication over others and provide no recognition of communicative difference, and (by implication) social or ethnic group difference. In other words, there is a sense in which this model of dialogic justice still remains monological, insofar as it posits only one speech genre” (Eckersley, 1999: 32, italic in original).

If we should recognize the voice of the marginalized including nature in communication community, who can represent nature? And how? Many alternatives were suggested. For example, ‘anticipatory internalisation’ (Goodin, 1996), ‘proxy representation’ (Dobson, 1996), and ‘rule of thumb procedure’ (Eckersley, 1999). However, one of these alternatives are far from all-inclusive. What we can say that, if we should represent nature, we need more democratic or egalitarian relationship with nature. This relationship can be called as ‘ecological democracy’.

“Yet there is a sense in which human relationships with nature are already the tradition of rationality. Based on thought of Hanna Arendt, Benhabib emphasizes ‘enlarged mentality’. Humans are equal in terms of subject to whom moral principle should be equally applied. At the same time, they are equal in terms of agency who make the principle(Benhabib, 1992).
political. As Val Plumwood points out in her contribution to this collection, politicisation is a concomitant of the human colonization of nature. Such colonisation connotes an authoritarian politics; democratisation would imply a more egalitarian politics here.....For ecological democrats, the regulative ideal is effectiveness in communication that transcends the boundary of the human world. As it enters human systems, then obviously ecological communication needs to be interpreted. However, unlike the situation in liberal democracy (or for that matter in Burnheim’s demarchy), this communication does not have to be mediated by the material interests of particular actors” (Dryzek, 1995: 23-24).

Therefore, in ecological democracy, the representation of nature is accomplished through an open-ended process which is discursive, democratic, and sensitive to ecological signs from nature. For rational re-enchantment of nature, ecologically democratic relationship should be desirable goal to be accomplished.

5.2. Ecologisation as Strategy for Rational Re-enchantment of Nature

As we have seen above, in capitalist society, the normative element of nature has been dissolved into its use. How can we correct it for the rational ‘re-enchantment of nature’? We can find an alternative normative strategy for it in argument of ‘ecologisation’ in Bruno Latour (1998). In defining the meaning of political ecology, he tries to suggest ‘political ecology’ as alternative for modernization. His argument of political ecology is based on the reinterpretation and application of Kantian morality to non-human (Latour, 1998: 231).

In reinterpretation of the Kant’s definition of morality, Latour suggests that it does not mean that we should not use, control, dominate, order, distribute or study them. It means that we should consider non-humans as ends not just means (Latour, 1998: 232). If there are no non-humans, we can not be humans (Latour, 1998: 231). His position should be understood as defending non-humans for their own ends. He follows the law which could have its origin in the will of the subject undergoing their action. We have to let non-humans partially to deploy their own finality which is in them (Latour, 1998: 233). Latour does not insist on certainty about means and ends. On the contrary, he suspends the certainty concerning ends and means.

“This suspension of certainty concerning ends and means speak to the question of how smallness and greatness are scaled in the ‘green city’. In the ‘green city’ what is small is knowing for sure that something has or,
conversely, has not a connection with another, and knowing it absolutely, irreversibly, as only an expert knows something. Something has value in the ‘green city’, something is great when it leaves open the question of solidarity between ends and means. Is everything interrelated? Not necessarily. We do not know what is interconnected and woven together. We are feeling our way, experimenting, trying things out. Nobody knows of what an environment is capable.” (ibid).

Because of the uncertainty of ends and means, non-human should be considered as quasi-object; that is, partly social and partly natural thing (Latour, 1993). In this point, Latour seems to differentiate himself from deep-ecologists who consider non-human as subject and supporters of developments who regard non-human as object. Finally, Latour juxtapose the meaning of ecologisation with modernisation as opponent one.

“‘Ecologising’ a question, an object or datum, does not mean putting it back into context and giving it an ecosystem. It means setting it in opposition, term for term, to another activity, pursued for three centuries and which is known, for want of a better term, as ‘modernisation’. Everywhere we have ‘modernised’ we must now ‘ecologise’. This slogan obviously remains ambiguous and even false, if we think of ecology as a complete system of relationships, as if it were only a matter of taking everything into account…...Ecologising’ means creating the procedures that make it possible to follow a network of quasi-objects whose relations of subordination remain uncertain and which thus require a new form of political activity adapted to following them. One understands that this opposition of modernisation and ecologisation goes much further than putting in place a principle of precaution or prudence like that of Jonas” (Latour, 1998: 235-236).

As a normative strategy for rational re-enchantment of nature, we can adopt the concept of ecologisation. Because it does not appeal to go back to the archaic pre-modern era. Instead, it raises question about the modernity, based on uncertainty of means and ends. Through this question, we can guarantee the reflexivity and justification for our critique. The politics of romance can not acquire such reflexivity, because they grounded their critique on intuition. Therefore, we can call the ‘ecologisation’ as normative strategy for rational re-enchantment of nature.
Based on ecologisation as normative strategy, we have to find out culturally different way of material appropriation of nature, and find out symbol or discourse for it. As the modern way of material appropriation of nature has prevailed over the world, many traditional way of material way of appropriation of nature has been ignored or oppressed. Therefore, we have to start to recover and reflect it at the same time with the strategy of ecologisation. Without this simultaneous recovery and reflection of it, we are likely to be caught the trap of reactionary romanticism.

At the dimension of symbolic construction of nature, as Eder says, symbolizing process of nature is a sort of battlefield. Many ecological discourses are competing and they consist of agenda of environmental politics (Dryzek, 1997; Hajer, 1995). Among the various ecological discourse, most popular and strong one is discourse of ‘sustainable development’. Of course this term contains so different implications (Redclift, 1987a). However, in spite of its multiple meanings, the term sustainable development does not raise a question about modernisation. It is very modern symbol of constructing nature. As we have seen above, we have to find out a symbol for the ecologisation. Since ‘symbolic construction of nature’ has historical and cultural specificity, it is very open question what is the symbol for the ecologisation for us. This is our own Rhodus island for rational re-enchantment of antiseptic nature.

<Reference>

Dryzek, J., 1990, “Green Reason: Communicative Ethics for the Biosphere”, Environment Ethics,


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